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Abstract—A unified approach to cooperative and non-
cooperative Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) is presented that 
addresses the technical and regulatory challenges of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) integration into non-
segregated airspace.  In this paper, state-of-the-art 
sensor/system technologies for cooperative and non-
cooperative SAA are reviewed and a reference system 
architecture is presented. Automated selection of 
sensors/systems including passive and active Forward Looking 
Sensors (FLS), Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) 
and Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 
system is performed based on Boolean Decision Logics (BDL) 
to support trusted autonomous operations during all flight 
phases. The BDL adoption allows for a dynamic 
reconfiguration of the SAA architecture, based on the current 
error estimates of navigation and tracking sensors/systems.  
The significance of this approach is discussed in the 
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic 
Management and Avionics (CNS+A) context, with a focus on 
avionics and ATM certification requirements.  Additionally, 
the mathematical models employed in the SAA Unified Method 
(SUM) to compute the overall uncertainty volume in the 
airspace surrounding an intruder/obstacle are described. In 
the presented methodology, navigation and tracking errors 
affecting the host UAS platform and intruder sensor 
measurements are translated to unified range and bearing 
uncertainty descriptors. Simulation case studies are presented 
to evaluate the performance of the unified approach on a 
representative UAS host platform and a number of intruder 
platforms.  The results confirm the validity of the proposed 
unified methodology providing a pathway for certification of 
SAA systems that typically employ a suite of non-cooperative 
sensors and/or cooperative systems. 
Keywords—Unmanned Aircraft Systems; Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle; Trusted Autonomy; Unified Approach; Cooperative 
Systems; Non-Cooperative Sensors; Sense-and-Avoid; CNS+A 
framework. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
One of the key challenges encountered by the aviation 
community for integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) into non-segregated airspace is the provision of a 
certifiable Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) capability [1]. SAA can 
be defined as the automatic detection of possible conflicts by 
the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and the resolution of 
any existing collision threats by accomplishing safe 
avoidance manoeuvres.  
The maturity of SAA techniques and enabling 
technologies is considered very limited when viewed in the 
perspective of civil airworthiness regulations for manned 
aircraft, raising concerns to certification authorities and 
airspace users [2]. One of the key technology enablers is the 
implementation of a unified methodology to non-cooperative 
and cooperative SAA that will provide UAV the capability to 
perform equally or even exceed the performance of the see-
and-avoid ability of a manned aircraft pilot.  Such an 
approach is considered essential in the evolving 
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic 
Management (CNS/ATM) and avionics (CNS+A) 
framework.  
The successive steps are integration of UAVs into the 
commercial airspace and then into the aerodrome areas, as 
identified in the Aviation System Block Upgrades (ASBU) 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [3]. 
Some recommendations towards addressing operational and 
certification issues for civil UAS were provided by the Joint 
Aviation Authorities (JAA) CNS/ATM Steering Group                
[4, 5]. Additionally, a number of special groups and 
committees such as ASTM F38, EUROCAE WG-73, ICAO 
UASSG and RTCA SC-228 are working on requirements, 
design, performance, quality acceptance tests and 
certification of UAS and its supporting systems including 
avionics, communication links and ground control station 
elements [4-6]. Current advances in state-of-the-art avionics 
technologies (sensors and multi-sensor data fusion software) 
have led to a number of innovative non-cooperative and 
cooperative SAA solutions [7]. Such techniques have been 
predominantly developed either for non-cooperative or 
cooperative scenarios. A number of global and regional 
programs are investigating such implementations. In 2009, 
the European Defense Agency commenced a project named 
Mid Air Collision Avoidance System (MIDCAS) to develop 
an experimental SAA system based on electro-optical, 
infrared and radar sensors [8]. Another such development 
was the establishment of the SAA Science and Research 
Panel (SARP) in the year 2011 by the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for acquisition, technology, 
and logistics in order to provide solutions for collision 
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avoidance [9]. Although these projects are addressing the 
requirements of SAA systems, a solid mathematical 
framework that can be used by the certification authorities is 
yet to be developed.  
This paper addresses the SAA problem by providing a 
cohesive approach that will support the certification process.  
In the CNS+A framework, the on board Flight Management 
System (FMS) for manned and unmanned aircraft acts as the 
main automated guidance service provider. In order to satisfy 
the Required Surveillance Performance (RSP) as a subset of 
the Required Total System Performance (RTSP), the FMS 
has to provide efficient separation maintenance as well as 
collision avoidance mechanisms. In a typical operational 
scenario, the host aircraft would have to maintain the 
required horizontal and vertical separation with other traffic 
and also have to sense in advance and avoid any potential 
conflicts. The host aircraft and other traffic might have be 
equipped with a different set of non-cooperative sensors and 
cooperative systems as shown in Fig. 1. The separation 
between aircraft is envisaged to include time as one of the 
control variables leading to the introduction of 4-
Dimensional Trajectories (4DT) in the CNS+A context. 
Additionally, the SAA system has to be capable of avoiding 
ground obstacles including small natural and man-made 
obstacles such as poles, power line cables, trees and 
mountains. 
Host UAV
Traffic A Traffic B
Traffic C
Traffic D
Cooperative System and 
Non-cooperative Sensor
Cooperative System Cooperative System
Non-Cooperative Sensor
Non-Cooperative Sensor
  
Fig. 1. 4D separation and collision avoidance tasks. 
II. SAA SENSOR AND SYSTEMS 
The requirements for designing and developing an 
effective SAA system can be inferred from the current 
regulations in place for see-and-avoid [10-12]. In case of see-
and-avoid, the main roles and responsibilities of pilots are 
stated in FAA AC 90-48C and FAR 91.113 and they are 
described in terms of regulations on maintaining vigilance, 
regardless of whether the operation is conducted under 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Visual Flight Rules (VFR). 
One of the fundamental limitations for certification 
authorities to fully certify SAA is to evaluate the ability of 
the current and future UAS to be able to replicate the human 
see-and-avoid capability, at a comparable or superior level 
upon replacing the on-board pilot. This is applicable both for 
the Ground Control Station (GCS) remote pilot and UAV 
platform when operated in a fully autonomous mode. The 
currently available SAA technologies do not completely 
meet the targeted levels of safety with the practical Size, 
Weight and Power (SWaP) criteria of UAV platforms for 
Line-Of-Sight (LOS) and Beyond Line-Of-Sight (BLOS) 
operations. The proposed detection range and Field of View 
(FOV) have to be adequate to ensure separation from 
intruders to prevent a probable mid-air collision. In case of 
cooperative scenarios, Automatic Dependent Surveillance–
Broadcast (ADS-B) systems, Portable Collision Avoidance 
System (PCAS), FLight AlaRM (FLARM) and different 
classes of Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) are 
employed for sensing and tracking intruders [13]. In recent 
years, a number of manned and unmanned aircraft are 
equipped with ADS-B transponders to locate, identify and 
communicate with neighbouring traffic. ADS-B, although 
might currently have lower levels of integrity, plays a crucial 
role, specifically for SAA, in order to support collision 
avoidance as well as separation maintenance. There have 
been studies performed on achieving SAA using a 
cooperative approach with ADS-B, superseding traditional 
practices using only non-cooperative sensors such as vision 
based sensors [14]. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations are 
highly prohibitive for UAS operations, expecting non-
cooperative sensors to be on board all UAV platforms, but 
this approach is changing [14]. In this perspective, a number 
of non-cooperative sensors have been employed for detecting 
and tracking other traffic in the surrounding airspace. A 
lightweight radar sensor and a computationally efficient 
method for determining collision avoidance manoeuvres 
proves efficient for avoiding any identified collision [15]. 
Vision-based sensors have been explored for a number of 
years considering the criticality of these systems in UAS 
applications. These systems are efficient in detecting real-
time collision conflicts at distances that are safe for 
performing an avoidance manoeuvre. The key issues 
associated with these sensors are the cost, high 
computational complexity and the need for high resolution 
sensors. Nevertheless, several research activities have 
focused on the development of low-cost vision-based sensors 
and the development of efficient algorithms to deal with the 
computational cost drawbacks associated with high-
resolution optical sensors. LIDAR has emerged as a 
promising technology for obstacle detection and tracking. 
The main advantages of this sensor are the higher levels of 
accuracy that can be achieved and the narrow FOV that it 
offers. Furthermore, these systems are typically 
complemented with other non-cooperative technologies, 
particularly in the case of SAA applications.  
Generally, the FOV has to be equivalent or superior to 
that of a pilot in the cockpit and it corresponds to a primary 
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FOV of 60˚ vertically/70˚ horizontally and a secondary FOV 
of 100˚ vertically and 120˚ horizontally. To satisfy this 
requirement, typically a suite of sensors including optical, 
thermal, LIDAR, MMW radar, Synthetic Aperture RADAR 
(SAR) and acoustic sensors are employed. LIDAR has been 
used for detecting, tracking and avoiding obstacles in low-
level flight [12]. The adoption of a multi-sensory approach to 
SAA (employing passive and active MMW radar, Forward 
Looking Infra-Red (FLIR), LIDAR and an Electronic 
Surveillance Module (ESM) for obstacle detection) has 
resulted in adequate performance especially in low- to 
medium-dynamics platform applications. Acoustic sensors 
are specifically used in small UAVs and they provide 
effective intruder detection a 360º FOV, that can be used for 
performing quick-reaction avoidance manoeuvres [16]. More 
recently, cooperative systems including TCAS and ADS-B 
systems are used in conjunction with a non-cooperative 
sensor suite [17]. Since a variety of information are 
available, effective multi-sensor data fusion techniques and 
novel Human Machine Interface (HMI) designs are required. 
Such considerations are addressed by researchers in the US 
Air Force Common Airborne Sense and Avoid (C-ABSAA) 
program and other programs.  
After identification and review of the state-of-the-art 
SAA technologies, Boolean Decision Logics (BDL) are 
employed, allowing a dynamic reconfiguration of the SAA 
architecture, based on the current error estimates of 
navigation and tracking sensors/systems. This SAA system 
reference architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2. The architecture 
allows automated selection of sensors/systems including 
passive and active Forward Looking Sensors (FLS), TCAS 
I/II/II or Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) 
I/II/III/X and ADS-B system is performed to support trusted 
autonomous operations during all flight phases.  A SAA 
approach that is dynamically reconfigurable based on the 
current performances of sensors/systems and satisfying the 
total required system performance will support the CNS+A 
framework. A typical example of selection is to prioritise 
TCAS data over ADS-B information, given the higher levels 
of integrity provided by the TCAS. The ground surveillance 
network information consisting of ATM RADAR tracks and 
Air Traffic Controller (ATCO) instructions in digital format 
are uplinked to the UAV platform and shared with the 
ground control station remote pilot.  Implementations 
involving Boolean logics are generally hard wired and 
cannot be reconfigured and this limits the scope of 
cooperative and non-cooperative SAA unified framework in 
terms of automatic decision-making capability. Therefore 
adaptive Boolean decision logics, which are based on real-
time monitoring of the SAA sensors/systems performances, 
are presented in the CNS+A context. A hierarchy for 
selecting sensors/systems is defined based on their current 
error estimates. Such implementations are feasible by 
employing field programmable gate arrays that can provide 
effective selecting and sorting mechanisms realised by an 
array of dedicated programmable logic blocks. 
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Fig. 2. Reconfigurable UAS SAA reference architecture. 
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes Effects 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) are required to identify 
the probability of failure associated with the sensor and 
system suite. As a result, the sensor/system, which provides 
the best state estimate of other traffic, is automatically 
selected. The presented approach thus provides trusted 
autonomy and robustness in all flight phases. The method 
lays foundations for the development of an airworthy SAA 
capability and a pathway for manned/unmanned aircraft 
coexistence in all classes of airspace. Thus, instead of 
implementing hardwired decision logics (given by a pre-
defined set of instructions), the dynamically reconfigurable 
logic ensures that the required levels of integrity are satisfied 
in all flight phases.  
III. SAA PROCESS 
An efficient Flight Management System (FMS) that 
enhances safety should address effectively both collision 
avoidance and separation maintenance tasks. In order to 
implement a common FMS functionality for manned and 
unmanned aircraft, key SAA tasks including Tracking, 
Decision-making and Avoidance (TDA) must be addressed 
considering the sequential steps depicted in Fig. 3.  
Obstacle/ Intruder 
Tracking 
Criticality Analysis – Prioritizing, 
Declaration & Action Determination
Avoidance Trajectory / Separation   
Commands Generation
Sensor Management – 
Multi-sensor Data Fusion
Flight Management System
 Autopilot 
Flight Control System
Intruder Trajectory 
Determination
 
Fig. 3. SAA system process. 
The processes that need to be performed are classified as: 
 Detection of obstacles (air and ground) and other 
traffic based on information obtained from multi-
sensor data fusion algorithms. 
 Tracking the detected obstacles and traffic and 
predicting other traffic states. 
 Prioritising collision risks and declaring flags for 
conflicts. 
 Determining the optimised avoidance trajectory and 
providing steering commands to the guidance 
component. 
 Execution of avoidance manoeuvres. 
The state vector of the tracked obstacles are obtained by 
employing multi-sensor data fusion algorithms including 
Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), Unscented Kalman Filter 
(UKF), Particle Filter (PF) and other knowledge-based 
techniques including learning based mechanisms in order to 
predict the intruder trajectory in a given time horizon. 
Currently, on-board trajectory re-planning with dynamically 
updated constraints based on intruder and the host UAV 
platform dynamics is used to generate obstacle avoidance 
trajectories [18]. After obtaining the trajectory information, 
criticality analysis is performed to prioritize (i.e. to 
determine if a collision risk threshold is exceeded for all 
tracked intruders) and to determine the steering commands 
required for executing an avoidance action. If possibility of a 
collision exists, the SAA system generates and optimises an 
avoidance trajectory according to a cost function that is 
based on minimum distance, fuel, time and closure rate 
criteria with the aid of differential geometry or pseudo-
spectral optimisation techniques to generate a smooth and 
flyable trajectory [19]. The Airborne Separation Assurance 
Function (ASAF) is implemented as a FMS component              
(Fig. 4). 
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Fig. 4. ASAF system architecture. 
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The ASAF gradually will transfer from the current 
ATCO controlled modes to distributed modes. The 
distributed modes provide robustness in terms of reliability. 
The FMS thus in addition to providing enhanced path 
planning, navigation, guidance and aircraft performance, 
provides automated separation assurance capabilities. The 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) is used for 
displaying traffic information. In the CNS+A context, the 
ASAF equipage required is summarised in Table I. 
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF ASAF EQUIPAGE. 
Equipage Type Equipage 
Communication 
Telecommunications datalinks, Controller 
Pilot Data Link Control (CPDLC), voice 
communication 
Navigation 
Navigation sensors                                                     
providing 3D/4D navigation 
Surveillance 
Cooperative systems (TCAS, ACAS, etc.)                                                           
Non-cooperative sensors                                      
(active and passive FLS) 
Situational Awareness CDTI Display 
Autonomous Decision 
Making 
Strategic, tactical and emergency flight 
planning and re-planning 
Intelligent conflict detection, resolution                  
and avoidance 
Weather and terrain avoidance 
The software functional architecture of ASAF is 
illustrated in Fig. 5.  
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Fig. 5. Airborne separation assurance software functional architecture. 
The ASAF software architecture consists of surveillance 
data processing, conflict detection and resolution, separation 
implementation and monitoring, nominal trajectory recovery, 
information processing and representation in a CDTI display.  
IV. TRAJECTORY OPTIMISATION ALGORITHMS 
In the context of conflict identification and resolution 
perspective, trajectory optimisation is characterised by the 
identification of the most suitable 3D/4D avoidance 
trajectory from the time of detection to a point where the 
avoidance trajectory re-joins with the nominal one. In this 
optimisation problem, dynamics/airspace constraints, user 
preferences, intruder trajectory, as well as meteorological 
and traffic conditions are considered. Hence, the adoption of 
computational algorithms required for trajectory optimisation 
in achieving SAA represents a substantial evolution from the 
conventional safe-steering methodologies adopted in current 
CNS/ATM systems. Current research efforts are addressing 
practical implementations of advanced multi-model and 
multi-objective 3D/4D trajectory optimisation algorithms in 
novel ground-based and airborne CNS+A systems [20]. Both 
direct and indirect methods are employed for computing an 
efficient avoidance trajectory. Most computationally 
efficient trajectory optimisation algorithms adopted for UAS 
applications belong to the family of direct methods. These 
solution methods involve the transcription of the infinite-
dimensional problem in a finite-dimensional Non-Linear 
Programming (NLP) problem, hence following the approach 
termed as “discretise then optimise”. Safety-critical 
applications of trajectory optimisation algorithms are 
actively investigated for airborne emergency Decision 
Support Systems (DSS), also known as safety-nets. These 
safety-critical CNS+A applications impose real-time 
requirements on the trajectory generation algorithm. 
Additionally, all generated trajectories must necessarily fulfil 
each and every set constraint, as the obstacle avoidance and 
the manoeuvring envelope are formulated as constraints. As 
a result, these requirements limit considerably the choice of 
solution methods and multi-objective optimality decision 
logics. Robust parallelised direct shooting solution methods 
with a posteriori decision logics are implemented for the 
generation of safe obstacle avoidance trajectories as part of 
the research on LIDAR for manned and unmanned aircraft 
[21, 22]. Direct shooting methods involving the transcription 
into finite-dimensional NLP problem can be either 
performed by introducing a control parameterisation based 
on arbitrarily chosen analytical functions, as in transcription 
methods, or by adopting a generalised piecewise 
approximation of both control and state variables based on a 
polynomial sequence of arbitrary degree, as in collocation 
methods. In both cases the transcribed dynamical system is 
integrated along the time interval between an initial and final 
time        . The search of the optimal set of discretisation 
parameters is formulated as a NLP problem, which is solved 
computationally by exploiting efficient numerical NLP 
algorithms. In direct transcription methods, a basis of known 
linearly independent functions        with unknown 
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coefficients    is adopted as the parameterisation in the 
general form: 
     ∑        
 
                                (1) 
In the direct shooting and multiple direct shooting, the 
parameterisation is performed on the controls      only. The 
dynamic constraints are integrated with traditional numerical 
methods including Runge-Kutta appraoch, and the Lagrange 
term is approximated by a quadrature approximation. The 
parameterisation of the control variables is this expressed as: 
     ∑        
 
                                (2) 
In case of multiple shooting, the analysed time interval is 
partitioned into      subintervals, and the direct shooting 
method is applied to each divided subinterval. Parallel 
implementations of direct shooting methods involve the 
simultaneous integration of a family of trajectories. The 
solution is based on different control parametrisation profiles 
and takes advantage of increasingly common multi-
thread/multi-core hardware architectures. The optimal 
solution is determined a posteriori, both in the case of single 
objective and multi objective implementations. In the unified 
approach, the following set of Differential Algebraic 
Equations (DAE) introducing a variable mass 3-DoF model 
was employed and are given as: 
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where the UAV state vector consists of the following 
variables: v is longitudinal velocity (scalar)  [m s
-1]; γ is 
flight path angle (scalar) [rad]; χ is track angle (scalar) [rad]; 
  is geographic latitude [rad]; λ is geographic longitude 
[rad]; z is flight altitude [m];   is thrust angle of attack [rad] 
and m is aircraft mass [kg]; and the variables forming the 
control vector are:  T is thrust force [N]; N is load factor [ ] 
and μ is bank angle [rad]. Other variables and parameters 
include: D is aerodynamic drag [N];    is wind velocity, in 
its three scalar components [m s-1]; g is the gravitational 
acceleration [m s
-2
];    is radius of the Earth [m] and FF is 
fuel flow [kg s
-1
]. Adopting a multi-phase trajectory 
optimisation formulation, the selection of the optimal 
avoidance trajectory in the safe steering phase is typically 
based on minimising a cost function of the following form 
[23, 24]: 
                                  ∫           (4) 
where      is the slant distance of the host platform along 
the avoidance trajectory from the avoidance volume 
associated with other traffic and                  is 
the time at which the safe avoidance condition is 
successfully attained, where TTT is the time-to-threat and 
AMT is the avoidance manoeuvre time [23].     is the host 
platform’s mass and {             } are the positive 
weightings attributed to time, distance, integral distance and 
fuel respectively. In time-critical avoidance applications (i.e., 
closing-up obstacles with high relative velocities), 
appropriate higher weightings are used for the time and 
distance cost elements. Separation maintenance also has to 
be achieved in the vicinity of airports. In this case a runway 
capacity model is considered taking into account the time of 
separation between host UAV platform and other traffic and 
is given by: 
         [
      
  
  
 
  
     ] when                   (5) 
         [
    
  
     ] when                         (6) 
where      is the time of separation,    and    are the 
velocities of adjacent aircraft,      is the distance of 
separation,   is the required separation and   represents the 
order of the separation required. 
V. SAA UNIFIED METHODOLOGY 
The presented SAA Unified Method (SUM) calculates 
the overall uncertainty volume surrounding the intruder 
tracks or obstacles in the airspace. In this method, both 
navigation error of the host UAV platform and tracking error 
of other traffic are combined in order to obtain an overall 
avoidance volume. Therefore, the navigation and tracking 
errors are expressed in range and bearing uncertainty 
descriptors. In order to estimate navigation and tracking 
errors, sensor error modelling is performed. The variation in 
the UAV state vector,   is expressed as: 
 (     )   [
  
  
]
 
                                (7) 
where p is the position of the UAV and t is the time of 
measurement. Let  ,   and   be the  range, azimuth and 
elevation obtained from A SAA sensor/system. Let   ,    
and    be the nominal range, azimuth and elevation values. 
Consider   ,    and    as standard deviations of the error in 
range, azimuth and elevation respectively. Hence, the error 
ellipsoids are given as:  
      
 
  
  
      
 
  
   
      
 
  
                         (8) 
  In order to develop a unified approach to cooperative 
and non-cooperative SAA, the error ellipsoids are typically 
subjected to two transforms: rotation, R and translation, T 
that is defined as a projection along the LOS vector of the 
UAV. The inverse transformation applied to one of the two 
ellipsoids with respect to another, L is thus expressed as: 
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                                                   (9) 
 The intruder position vector,   translated from host body 
frame to Earth Centred Earth Fixed (ECEF) reference frame 
with respect to   is given by: 
 ̃                                                 (10) 
 The intruder position vector uncertainty in ECEF frame 
(  ̃) is expressed as: 
  ̃                                            (11) 
where    is the error in the position vector of other traffic in 
the host body frame and    is the rotation (angular) error 
matrix. The rotation matrix in terms of azimuth and elevation 
angles is given by: 
  [
             
              
     
]                        (12) 
where c and s represent cosine and since of azimuth and 
elevation angles. Therefore the position vector after rotation 
is expressed as: 
[
 ̃
 ̃
 ̃
]  [
             
              
     
] [
 
 
 
]                  (13) 
 The angular error matrix is given by: 
   
 [
                                         
                                         
            
](14) 
and the error in position is expressed as: 
[
  ̃
  ̃
  ̃
]   
[
                                         
                                         
            
] [
 
 
 
] (15) 
 [
             
              
     
] [
  
  
  
]                        
 In a static non-cooperative case, the errors in range, 
azimuth and elevation are given by: 
                                            (16) 
                                        (17) 
                                            (18) 
where   ,   ,    are the nominal range, azimuth and 
elevation measurements. { ,  } are the parameterization 
factors required for reduced information transfer between air 
and ground systems. The transformation of { ,  ,  } to {x, 
y, z} is given by: 
                                           (19) 
                                            (20) 
                                             (21) 
 Correlation analysis of the measurements provided by the 
SAA sensors/systems is essential to determine the overall 
uncertainty volume. As a result uncorrelated, covariant and 
contravariant cases are possible. As an example, considering 
ADS-B measurements obtained from the host UAV and 
other traffic, the dependences of errors in {x, y, z} on the 
correlation between the sensor measurements are given by: 
  
       
      
             )              (22) 
  
       
      
             )              (23) 
  
       
      
            )               (24) 
where {   ,         } is the position of the intruder 
obtained from ADS-B, {   ,         } is the position of the 
host UAV obtained from ADS-B and {          ,           , 
          } define the correlation between the system 
measurements. An example of the two combined navigation 
and tracking error ellipsoids assuming error in range only, 
and the resulting uncertainty volumes for uncorrelated and 
correlated (covariant and contravariant) sensor error 
measurements (3 out of a total of 27 possibilities) are 
illustrated in Fig. 6 and 7 respectively. 
 
Fig. 6. Uncertainty volume obtained from range only uncorrelated errors. 
 
Fig. 7. Uncertainty volumes obtained from range only correlated errors. 
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 In the dynamic case, the uncertainty volume is obtained 
based on a confidence region governed by the errors in {x, y, 
z} given by: 
  
      
       
             )                 (25) 
  
      
       
             )                 (26) 
  
      
       
             )                  (27) 
 When an error in elevation and azimuth is present, the 
resultant volume obtained at the estimated range is illustrated 
in Fig. 8. In a dynamic case, there exist a variation of 
uncertainty volume in every time epoch due to errors in 
range and bearing, and relative dynamics between the 
platforms.  
 
Fig. 8. Uncertainty volume obtained as a result of bearing errors at the 
estimated range. 
  
VI. SIMULATION CASE STUDIES 
 Simulation case studies were performed using the 
AEROSONDE UAV as the host platform. In all the cases, 
the host UAV was presumed to be equipped with both non-
cooperative sensors (vision-based camera and LIDAR) and 
cooperative system (ADS-B). Other traffic including manned 
and unmanned aircraft platforms (AEROSONDE UAV and 
Airbus A320 aircraft) were considered in the simulation case 
studies. In the first case, it is assumed that no cooperative 
systems are on board the intruder (AEROSONDE UAV). 
The uncertainty volume is generated in real-time after 
evaluating the risk of collision at the collision point (Fig. 9).  
An avoidance trajectory is generated (based on the platform 
dynamics) to maintain the required separation maintenance 
(more than 500 m) and also to prevent any mid-air collisions 
at all of the predicted time epochs. A typical case is that of 
multiple traffic performing cooperative and/or non-
cooperative surveillance, as well as communicating with the 
ground ATM systems [25, 26]. In this scenario, potential 
conflicts are defined as close encounters in the 4D space-
time domain. Close-encounters are typically evaluated as 
part of an intermediate step for pruning the full set of 
potential conflicts. Such 4D close-encounters are assumed to 
occur when the relative distance (i.e., the norm of the 3D 
relative position vector) between the nominal positions of a 
pair of traffic at a certain time is below a specified threshold. 
For all identified close-encounters, the uncertainty volume 
associated with host and intruder platforms are determined. 
 
Fig. 9. Avoidance trajectory generation by host UAV platform. 
 Due to bandwidth limitations existing in current 
communication systems, a compact and versatile 
parameterisation of the uncertainty volume is highly 
desirable to extrapolate its actual shape and size at close 
encounter points with minimal data link and computational 
burden. In the second case, both host unmanned aircraft and 
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intruder (Airbus A320 aircraft) platforms are assumed to 
have on board ADS-B systems. The host unmanned platform 
computes an avoidance trajectory as per the rules of flight 
while the other traffic performs a step descend phase to 
avoid the mid-air collision. The cost function use to obtain 
these avoidance trajectories are the same as defined in 
equation 4. As in the first case, in this scenario as well, the 
required horizontal and vertical separation distances were 
achieved. The simulations were performed on a Windows 7 
Professional workstation (64-bit OS) supported by an Intel 
Core i7-4510 CPU with clock speed 2.6 GHz and 8.0 GB 
RAM. The execution time for uncertainty volume 
determination and avoidance trajectory optimisation 
algorithms was in the order of 8 sec. Such an implementation 
makes it possible to perform real-time separation 
maintenance tasks as well as avoidance of any identified 
collisions (emergency scenarios). The significance of the 
SUM is its focus towards addressing avionics and ATM 
certification requirements in the CNS+A context.  In order to 
fulfil safety requirements for SAA system certification, 
performance monitoring and augmentation algorithms 
(including integrity) have to be implemented encompassing 
the entire CNS sensors/systems chains and the associated 
navigation and tracking loops.  In the CNS+A context, this 
means that either a specified level of performance is 
available (with a specified maximum probability of failure) 
or, if not, a usable integrity flag is generated within a 
specified maximum Time-To-Alert (TTA). Using suitable 
data link and signal processing technologies on the ground, a 
certified SAA capability can thus become a core element of 
future network-centric ATM operations.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
State-of-the-art non-cooperative and cooperative 
technologies for SAA were identified and a reference system 
architecture was presented. The algorithms employed to 
achieve effective self-separation and collision avoidance 
functionalities were described. In particular, a unified SAA 
analytical framework was presented that allows computing 
the overall avoidance volume associated with single/multiple 
intruder tracks and computes the optimal avoidance 
trajectory when cooperative/non-cooperative detection is 
performed with avionics and ATM sensor/system inputs. 
Simulation case studies were presented to corroborate the 
effectiveness of the proposed approach. This method 
provides a clear pathway to certification of next generation 
SAA (and ACAS) systems for both manned and unmanned 
aircraft. Future research activities will address the full-scale 
development of the proposed SAA system in a variety of 
UAV platforms. Additionally, in order to meet the CNS+A 
integrity requirements, a suitable Avionics-Based Integrity 
Augmentation (ABIA) architecture will be employed                   
[27, 28]. 
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